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CERTAIN CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES OF EU-US 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE SIGNING 
OF THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP)
Stefan Martinić and Mihael Maljak*
Summary: In this paper, the authors discuss the main arguments for 
and against the most controversial individual issues in negotiations 
over the potential EU-US free trade agreement. The paper takes into 
account differences between the USA and EU and tackles the most 
controversial individual issues which threaten to derail the negotia-
tions, and individual issues which seem dubious from the perspective 
of the general public.
1. Introduction
In the autumn of 2014, the European Union (EU) and United States 
of America (USA) vigorously negotiated a comprehensive transatlan-
tic free-trade agreement called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). The agreement between the EU and USA would be 
unprecedented in terms of its sheer dimension. The EU and USA are the 
world’s major global traders and investors. In fact, the EU is the largest 
economy in the world, representing 25.1% of world GDP and 17.0% of 
world trade, while the USA is the second largest economy, accounting 
for 21.6% of world GDP and 13.4% of world trade.1 Together, the EU and 
USA account for almost half of world GDP and one third of total world 
trade.2 TTIP would create a free-trade area representing nearly 50% of 
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1 European Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Impact Assessment Re-
port on the Future of EU-US Trade Relations Accompanying the Document Recommenda-
tion for a Council Decision Authorising the Opening of Negotiations on a Comprehensive 
Trade and Investment Agreement, called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship, between the European Union and the United States of America’ [2013] 2. 
2 European Commission (n 1).
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global economic output, with only 11.8% of the world population.3 Both 
the EU and USA hope that the new free trade agreement (FTA) will weak-
en the influence of emerging markets such as China, Russia, Brazil, India 
and South Africa.4
The first tangible step towards further transatlantic economic inte-
gration was taken during the 28 November 2011 summit meeting, when 
President José Manuel Barroso, President Herman Van Rompuy, and 
President Barack Obama established the High Level Working Group on 
Jobs and Growth (HLWG), whose main task was to ‘identify and assess 
options for strengthening the EU-USA economic relationship’.5 In its fi-
nal report of 13 February 2013, the HLWG specified the extent to which 
the parties agreed on the scope and shared ambition of the future part-
nership, and reached the conclusion that a ‘comprehensive agreement 
… would provide the most significant mutual benefit’.6 In accordance 
with the HLWG recommendations, the leaders of the EU and USA an-
nounced the initiation of the internal procedures necessary to launch 
negotiations,7 after which the European Commission drafted the negotia-
tion mandate,8 which the Council of the European Union adopted.9 In its 
October 2012 resolution, the European Parliament called for negotiations 
to be launched in the first half of 2013.10
3 G Felbermayr and others, ‘Dimensions and Effects of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agree-
ment between the EU and USA’ (Study) [2013] IFOI 1.
4 See also M Venhaus, ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership as a New 
Strategy to Marginalize Emerging Powers: A Divided Free Trade Order in the Making?’ in D 
Cardoso, P Mthembu, M Venhaus and M Verde Garrido (eds), The Transatlantic Colossus 
(Berlin Forum on Global Politics in collaboration with the Internet & Society Collaboratory 
and FutureChallenges.org 2014) 59-62.
5 Council of the European Union, ‘EU-US Summit joint statement’ (Press release) [2011] 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/20/eu-us-summit-joint-state-
ment> accessed 19 December 2013; High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, ‘In-
terim Report to Leaders from the Co-Chairs EU-USA High Level Working Group on Jobs and 
Growth’ [2012] 1 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/june/tradoc_149557.pdf> 
accessed 19 December 2013.
6 High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, ‘Final Report - High Level Working 
Group on Jobs and Growth’ [2013] 1 <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/febru-
ary/tradoc_150519.pdf> accessed 19 December 2013.
7 See also European Commission, ‘Statement from United States President Barack Obama, 
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President 
José Manuel Barroso’ (Press Release Memo 13/94) (2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-94_en.pdf> accessed 7 July 2014.
8 See also K De Gucht, ‘A Negotiating Mandate for a Trade and Investment Agreement with 
the United States’ (European Commission Memo/13/212 2013) <http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_MEMO-13-212_en.pdf> accessed 7 July 2014.
9 Council of the European Union, ‘Council Approves Launch of Trade and Investment 
Negotiations with the United States’ (Press Release 10919/13) [2013] <http://www.con-
silium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/137485.pdf> accessed 7 
July 2014.
10 Although the European Parliament does not have a formal role in approving the nego-
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The first round of TTIP negotiations was held in the week of 8 July 
2013 in Washington, DC, where the main objective was met: a substan-
tive round of talks on the full range of topics intended to be covered 
in the agreement.11 The round was accompanied by various stakehold-
er events, and talks were based on a thorough review of the expressed 
stakeholder views. A second round was held in the week of 7 October 
2013 in Brussels, where the two sides continued where they had left off 
in July. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht stated that ‘[g]ood and 
steady progress’ had been made across a ‘broad range of issues’.12 In 
Brussels, on 20 December 2013, when the third round was completed, 
both sides again discussed all the topics they wished to see covered in 
TTIP along with public consultations.13 Progress was made on the three 
core parts of TTIP: market access, regulatory aspects and trade-related 
rules. These were the focus of the fourth round of talks concluded on 14 
March 2014.14 In the subsequent rounds of negotiations, the EU and US 
started to discuss the wording of proposals.15
Trade policy and FTAs are not just matters for economists and law-
yers. Trade policy is much more than the economics of importing and 
exporting; it has become a major political weapon with great social, envi-
ronmental and cultural consequences. TTIP would not just have a great 
effect on the EU and its Member States but also on the everyday lives of 
its citizens. 
This paper will discuss the arguments for and against the most con-
troversial issues in the negotiations on TTIP.
tiating mandate, it can adopt a resolution; Parliament Resolution (EP) 2012/2149 of 23 
October 2012 on trade and economic relations with the United States [2003].
11 European Commission, ‘First Round of TTIP Negotiations Kicks off in Washington DC’ 
(Press release) [2013] <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151595.
pdf> accessed 7 July 2014.
12 Progress was made in identifying areas of common ground in order to start preparing 
for text-based discussions in the rounds ahead; K De Gucht, ‘EU and US Conclude Second 
Round of TTIP Negotiations in Brussels’ (News archive) [2013] <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=988> accessed 22 December 2013.
13 ‘This followed unprecedented efforts by the EU to negotiate as openly as possible and 
reach out to the widest possible range of interests’, European Commission, ‘EU Chief Ne-
gotiator Says EU-US Trade Deal not about Deregulation, as Third Round of Talks End 
in Washington’ (press release) [2013] <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1306_
en.pdf> accessed 7 July 2014.
14 Office of the United States Trade Representative, ‘Statement by US Trade Representative 
Michael Froman at the Close of the Fourth Round Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership Negotiations’ (press release) [2014] <http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/
press-releases/2014/March/Statement-by-USTR-Froman-at-close-of-fourth-round-TTIP-
negotiations> accessed 29 March 2014.
15 See also European Commission, ‘Resources’ (press materials) [2014] <http://ec.europa.
eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/resources/index_en.htm#_documents> accessed 30 Octo-
ber 2014.
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The negotiations and the outlook of TTIP have raised many different 
issues. However, the authors will limit the discussion to: 1) the most con-
troversial issues of the negotiations; 2) issues identified as separate and 
individual topics for discussion. The issues that satisfy these two condi-
tions and which will be analysed in this paper are: exception culturelle, 
GMOs, investor state dispute settlement, and intellectual property rights. 
Of course, TTIP would have other far-reaching and comprehensive effects 
on the EU and USA and their relations, but these will not be analysed in 
this paper. One such issue is the environment. However, for the sake of 
brevity, the authors have decided to limit the scope of this paper to only 
those individual issues in negotiations which were designated by the ne-
gotiators as individual chapters for the negotiations. 
To answer the main question of the paper, the authors will firstly 
use the EU’s negotiation mandate (which was adopted by the EU Foreign 
Affairs Council) to present the topics of the negotiations. This document 
is officially confidential but has been leaked online. The authors will also 
use official documents of the EU Commission regarding the EU’s posi-
tion on certain topics of the negotiations and also for information about 
the stage of the development of the negotiations. By the same token, the 
documents of the US Chambers of Commerce are used to understand US 
positions on certain key issues. In addition, the paper will contain refer-
ences from unofficial documents about TTIP, academic papers, newspa-
per articles and NGO reports. The authors will approach the literature 
as a tool for shaping the discussion on TTIP while being analytical and 
critical.
2. Exception culturelle
The first roadblock for the negotiators on TTIP was the audiovisual 
sector, in particular the notorious exception culturelle. At the very start, 
Aurélie Filippetti, the French Minister of Culture, forged an alliance with 
ministers of culture from 14 other EU states to take the audiovisual sec-
tor16 off the negotiating agenda.17 The EU Parliament underscored these 
demands in a resolution calling for the ‘exclusion of cultural and au-
diovisual services, including those provided online’.18 Ultimately, France 
made its approval of the European Commission’s negotiating mandate 
16 The term audiovisual refers to cultural products: motion pictures, television, home vid-
eo, musical recordings, etc.
17 The French Embassy in London, ‘EU-US Free Trade: France not Alone in Upholding 
Cultural Exception’ <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/France-not-alone-in-upholding> ac-
cessed 12 February 2014.
18 Parliament Motion (EP) 2013/2558 for a Resolution to Wind up the Debate on the State-
ments by the Council and the Commission on EU Trade and Investment Negotiations with 
the United States of America [2013].
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dependent on the adoption of l’exception culturelle19 and won the day to 
the plaudits of Germany’s cultural sector.20 The French offensive was a 
success. The present mandate explicitly excludes audiovisual services 
from the negotiating mandate21 and in various places also commits itself 
to the safeguarding of cultural diversity with direct reference to the UN-
ESCO Convention.22
EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht was quick to point out in a 
press conference that while audiovisual was not in the planned chapter 
on ‘trade in services and establishment’ for the time being, it had been 
agreed that the Commission could come back to the issue to ask for a 
new mandate on it.23 Although the EU negotiators described l’exception 
culturelle as a ‘not in, not out’ formula because of the right of the EU 
Commission to ask for a new mandate on it, the new mandate would re-
quire a unanimous vote and the French Minister of Culture insisted that 
they would again say ‘No’.24 It could be said that the negotiating team 
used the formula as a way to satisfy the French and to try to dissuade the 
USA from retaliation, as the US negotiators could say that if the EU was 
excluding certain sectors from the very beginning, then the USA could 
also exclude a certain sector that was valuable to them.
If the provisions on liberalisation of the audiovisual sector end up 
in TTIP, ie if there is no exception culturelle, it would be the first EU 
trade agreement to contain provisions on the wider liberalisation of the 
sector,25 given that the provisions of GATT and other bilateral contracts 
19 Cultural exception policy includes quotas and subsidies for productions which promote 
locally and regionally produced content.
20 ‘EU ebnet Weg für Freihandelsgespräche’ Zeit Online, (Hamburg 15 June 2013) <http://
www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2013-06/freihandelszone-verhandlungen-usa-eu-mandat> accessed 
12 February 2014; A Kämpf, ‘Europa eine Seele geben? Eine halbwegs funktionierende eu-
ropäische Zivilgesellschaft wäre ja auch schon etwas’ Politik & Kultur (Berlin September/
October 2013) 11 <http://www.kulturrat.de/dokumente/puk/puk2013/puk05-13.pdf> ac-
cessed 12 February 2014.
21 The Mandate was adopted by the EU Foreign Affairs Council. The document is officially 
confidential but has been leaked online; General Secretariat of the Council, ‘Directives for 
the Negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the Europe-
an Union and the United States’ 21 (EU negotiation mandate June 2013) <http://www.s2b-
network.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/EU-TTIP-Mandate-from-bfmtv-June17-2013.
pdf> accessed 7 July 2014.
22 General Secretariat of the Council (n 21) 6, 9.
23 M Ermert, ‘Controversial Debate on TTIP Mandate in EU Council of Ministers’ <http://
www.ip-watch.org/2013/06/14/audiovisual-sector-out-of-eu-mandate-for-ttip/> accessed 
12 February 2014.
24 ‘EU Reaches Deal on French “cultural exception”’ France 24 <http://www.france24.
com/en/20130615-eu-deal-french-cultural-exception-usa-trade/> accessed 12 February 
2014.
25 The cultural industry, and in particular the audiovisual industry, has never featured in 
a commercial treaty in the world. It is hardly surprising that the ‘cultural exemption’ has 
been around ever since talk of trade liberalisation first began. Article 4 of the very first ver-
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already apply in this sector. If that is the case, the provisions of TTIP re-
garding the trade in services and establishment would cover all sectors 
and all modes of supply, including the audiovisual sector. The parties 
would also have to agree to grant treatment no less favourable for the 
establishment in their territory of audiovisual sector companies, subsidi-
aries or branches of other parties than that accorded to their own compa-
nies, subsidiaries or branches.26 L’exception culturelle is particularly dear 
to the French, to whom it was granted to maintain quotas and subsidies 
to protect their cultural markets based on the provisions made during 
the Uruguay round of international trade talks in 1993 to ensure that 
culture is treated differently from other commercial products. It notably 
allowed France to introduce quotas for local music and film on national 
TV and radio stations and to subsidise its industry.27 With the accept-
ance of l’exception culturelle, the Member States will continue to be able 
to support their cultural industries, particularly the audiovisual sector, 
through broadcasting quotas, subsidies, etc.28
From the start, it proved to be a very controversial topic that showed 
a division in the EU itself.29 For instance, Manuel Barosso, the Presi-
sion of GATT in 1948 gave states the possibility of introducing quotas for ‘films of national 
origin’ in the audiovisual sector (WTO 1986, 8; M Hahn, ‘A Clash of Cultures? The UNESCO 
Diversity Convention and International Trade Law’ (2006) JIEL 522). Furthermore, Article 
20 sanctions government measures ‘necessary to protect public morals’ and ‘national treas-
ures of artistic, historic or archaeological value’ (WTO 1986). Even though GATT has never 
enshrined any general exemption for cultural products, it is visible that the cultural sector 
does indeed play a special role in free trade agreements. As an example, one can look at how 
most states used the provisions of GATT to leave their cultural sectors out of the scope of 
free trade regulations; For more, see: JM Grant, ‘“Jurassic” Trade Dispute: The Exclusion 
of the Audiovisual Sector from the GATT’ (1995) ILJ 1334-1365.
26 European Commission, ‘Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and In-
vestment Partnership between the European Union and the United States of America’, para 
16 <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11103-2013-DCL-1/en/pdf> ac-
cessed 19 October 2014.
27 European Commission (n 26) 21; See also: EurActiv, ‘France Draws Red Lines for EU-
USA Free Trade Negotiations’ (London 20 March 2013) <http://www.euractiv.com/global-
europe/france-draws-red-lines-eu-us-fre-news-518616> accessed 27 June 2014.
28 EurActiv (n 27).
29 For more on this topic, see: V Bala and NV Long, ‘International Trade and Cultural Diver-
sity with Preference Selection’ (2005) EJPE 143-162; C Crook, J Micklethwait, ‘Globalisa-
tion: Making Sense of an Integrating World’ (2002) 56 TES; Deutscher Bundestag, Antwort 
der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Dr Petra Sitte, Ulla Lötzer, 
Dr Kirsten Tackmann und der Fraktion DIE LINKE: Das geplante Freihandelsabkommen 
TTIP/TTIP zwischen den USA und der Europäischen Union und seine Auswirkungen auf 
die Bereiche Kultur, Landwirtschaft, Bildung, Wissenschaft und Datenschutz, Drucksache 
17/14734, Berlin, 09/11/2013; G Felbermayr, B Heid, S Lehwald, ‘Die Transatlantische 
Handels und Investitionspartnerschaft. Wem Nutzt Eintransatlantisches Freihandelsab-
kommen’, Teil 1: Makroökonomische Effekte, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, (2011); S 
Formentini and L Lapadre, ‘Cultural Diversity and Regional Trade Agreements: The Case of 
Audiovisual Services’ (2007) UNU-CRIS WP W-2007/4; P Sauvé and K Steinfatt, ‘Towards 
Multilateral Rules in Trade and Culture: Protective Regulation or Efficient Protection?’, in: 
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dent of the European Commission, when referring to the proponents of 
l’exception culturelle, was quoted as saying: ‘some say they belong to the 
left, but in fact they are culturally extremely reactionary and have an 
anti-global agenda’.30 Opponents of the exception have repeatedly warned 
that excluding any economic sector could hand the USA an early bar-
gaining chip in what promise to be tough negotiations. Since the EU au-
diovisual and cultural market is already relatively open to US companies, 
while US market access is still very limited for European companies,31 
one could say that the EU would lose economic gains by excluding the 
audiovisual sector and risk losing further gains from other excluded sec-
tors if the USA retaliated.
Although there are two different opinions regarding the exception, 
both sides use the same argument: cultural diversity. Opponents argue 
that the trading of cultural products may be expected to have an influ-
ence on the perceptions, values and norms of the importing society.32 At 
the same time, trade in cultural products also contributes to cultural 
diversity within a society, because it increases the range of available cul-
tural products.33 Additionally, the belief is that trade in cultural products 
opens horizons and broadens our perspectives, and there is also a senti-
ment of belonging to the same humanity, which is a very important con-
cept against all forms of narrow nationalism and protectionism.34
In contrast, proponents argue that Hollywood’s supremacy in the 
audiovisual sector would harm the cultural diversity and national iden-
tity of Member States.35 They also emphasise that US artists already rep-
Productivity Commission and the Australian National University (eds), Achieving Better Reg-
ulation of Services (2002), 323-337; JE Rauch, V Trindade, ‘Neckties in the Tropics: A Model 
of International Trade and Cultural Diversity’, (2005) NBER WP No 11890. 
30 A Higgins, ‘European Official Takes on the French’ The new York Times (New York 16 
June 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/business/global/european-union-
divided-before-g-8-meeting.html?_r=0> accessed 12 February 2014.
31 MA Kirchschlager, ‘In between Curious Economics and l’Exception Culturelle: Im-
plications of TAFTA | TTIP for the Cultural Sector’, 25 February 2014 <http://future-
challenges.org/local/in-between-curious-economics-and-lexception-culturelle-impli-
cations-of-tafta-ttip-for-the-cultural-sector/> accessed 28 July 2014; See also: AG von 
Lambsdorff, ‘Interview with Alexander Wolkers, TTIP-Verhandlungen: Pro und Contra’ 
ARTE Journal (Berlin 31 May 2013) <http://www.arte.tv/de/ttip-verhandlungen-pro-
undcontra/7532172,CmC=7532074.html> accessed 13 February 2014.
32 AC Disdier and others, ‘Bilateral Trade of Cultural Goods’ (2010) RWE 575-595.
33 Hahn (n 25) 515, 537.
34 Higgins (n 30).
35 MA Kirschschlager, ‘In Between Curious Economics and L’Exception Culturelle: Impli-
cations of TAFTA/TTIP for the Cultural Sector’ in Cardoso, Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde 
Garrido (eds) (n 4) 80-83; Greek-French movie director Costa Gavras and French actress 
Berenice Bejo were part of a film-industry delegation that showed up at the European Par-
liament in Strasbourg in France to say the ‘cultural exception’ isn’t negotiable. ‘We risk see-
ing only American works’ Gavras told reporters in the 27-nation European Union assembly. 
‘It’s a cultural invasion. We don’t want that’, in J Stearns, ‘European Film Stars Urge Exclu-
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resent around 50% of overall airplay and downloads in pan-European 
charts.36 In addition, many EU cultural markets, including the music 
sector, are based on very specific regulatory frameworks.37 The EU music 
sector is also less homogeneous and less concentrated than the US mar-
ket, especially in the field of digital access and distribution.38 For these 
reasons, including the audiovisual sector in the European Commission’s 
mandate would neither contribute to reinforcing European players on the 
EU market nor result in the growth of exports of European products or 
services to the USA.
As things stand, the USA already sells the EU more music, mov-
ies, and radio and television programmes than it buys from Europe. Its 
net surplus for the sector averaged 1.5 billion euros a year from 2004 
to 2011.39 Because of the undeniable existence of US cultural products 
in the EU, and because of their domination, one could say that cultural 
diversity already exists in the Union. Thus, the opponents of TTIP argue 
that if we preserve the status quo with more or less the same trade policy 
as at present and with more or less the same trade outcome between the 
EU and USA, we will not be depriving ourselves of foreign culture, espe-
cially not US cultural products.
Although, 1.5 billion euros a year might seem a large amount, the 
EU and US already trade goods and services worth 2 billion euros every 
day. The US surplus of 1.5 billion euros per year in the audiovisual sec-
tor is not so big if we take into account the total value of trade per year in 
all sectors between the two sides. Opponents believe that there is a rea-
sonable fear that the imbalance will only increase under a trade deal, as 
digital and internet services,40 already dominated by US technology com-
panies, have become ever more popular. At present, the EU audiovisual 
sector is worth 17 billion euros and provides jobs for a million people.41 
sion of Culture from EU-U.S. Talks’ (Bloomberg, 12 June 2013) <http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2013-06-11/european-film-stars-urge-exclusion-of-culture-from-eu-u-s-talks.
html> accessed 22 November 2014.
36 Austrian Music Export, ‘EU/USA Free Trade Agreement: Exclusion of the Audiovisual 
Sector’ <http://www.musicexport.at/euusa-free-trade-agreement-exclusion-of-the-audio-
visual-sector/> accessed 12 February 2014.
37 Austrian Music Export (n 36).
38 Austrian Music Export (n 36).
39 P Blenkinsop and R Emmott, ‘France backs EU-USA Trade Talks after Culture Clash’ 
Reuters (London 14 June 2013) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/14/us-eu-us-
trade-idUSBRE95D0BE20130614> accessed 13 February 2014.
40 In addition, no one today with the best faith in the world can tell what the future content 
and media support for audiovisual and cultural policies will be.
41 Blenkinsop and Emmott (n 39), eg France, widely considered to be the birthplace of 
cinema, has a proud tradition of more than a century of publicly and critically acclaimed 
movies, and pumps in more public funds to its film industry than any other EU mem-
ber. Cinema-goers pay a levy on each ticket to help fund the French film industry, which 
many believe could not survive without such support in the face of Hollywood’s dominance. 
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This could be endangered if US domination increases and has a negative 
effect on the EU audiovisual sector.
Although the EU would also profit from further liberalisation of the 
US audiovisual sector, because of Hollywood’s dominance, opponents 
might say that the liberalisation of the audiovisual sector on both sides 
would bring more costs than gains to the EU. If the EU wants to keep its 
cultural diversity and the national identity of EU Member States, it will 
have to preserve an adequate balance. Based on the arguments men-
tioned above, exclusion of the audiovisual sector from the chapter on 
trade in services and establishment seems like a more valid option than 
including it.
3. Genetically modified organisms
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are one of the most contro-
versial issues concerning sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures42 
within TTIP negotiations, and are a part of the second section of negotia-
tions: regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers. Although GMOs are not 
explicitly mentioned in the Commission’s directives for the negotiations 
on TTIP, SPS measures are included, and tacitly the question of allowing 
GM products to enter the EU arises, and giving an answer to it becomes 
inevitable.
Allowing GMOs produced in the USA to freely roam the EU market43 
sends a chill down the spines of most Europeans when they first hear 
that such an option could ever be possible.44 Such an attitude on the 
French television stations are required to air at least 40 percent home-produced content, 
with another 20 percent coming from Europe, before American TV soap operas even get a 
look in; France 24 (n 24).
42 Sanitary and phytosanitary measures include ‘all relevant laws, decrees, regulations, 
requirements and procedures’ that are ‘applied to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health within the territory of a country from risks arising from plant pests (insects, bac-
teria, virus), additives, residues (of pesticides or veterinary drugs), contaminants (heavy 
metals), toxins or disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs, and dis-
eases carried by animals’; European Commission ‘Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues‘ 
[2013] <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/april/tradoc_150986.pdf> accessed 
29 January 2014.
43 About 70% of all processed foods sold in US supermarkets contain GMOs. By contrast, 
almost no GM food is on sale in EU supermarkets, and all food that contains GM ingre-
dients must be labelled as such; See also: J Hillary, ‘TTIP: Charter for Deregulation and 
Attack on Jobs’ 18-20 <http://www.bilaterals.org/?ttip-a-charter-for-deregulation-an> ac-
cessed 8 March 2014.
44 S Bonny, ‘Why are Most Europeans Opposed to GMOs? Factors Explaining Rejection 
in France and Europe’, (2010) EJB 3; ‘Europeans are prickly about American agricultural 
practices, like the use of genetically modified foods’, Economist, ‘Trade Negotiations Between 
America and the European Union Will not be Smooth’ <http://www.economist.com/news/
finance-and-economics/21580512-trade-negotiations-between-america-and-european-un-
ion-will-not-be> accessed 7 March 2014.
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part of EU citizens is certainly the cause of the difference in regulatory 
approach,45 and somewhat differs from the one that US citizens have.46
The Commission, however, when giving directions in negotiations 
about regulatory issues and non-tariff barriers, states that:
regulatory compatibility shall be without prejudice to the right to 
regulate in accordance with the level of health, safety, consumer, 
labour and environmental protection and cultural diversity that 
each side deems appropriate, or otherwise meeting legitimate 
regulatory objectives.47 
With the given nature of such instructions, we can conclude that the 
Commission wants to have leeway so it can avoid giving GMOs full ac-
cess to the EU market. When specifically referring to SPS measures, the 
Commission wants:
measures based on science and on international standards or 
scientific risk assessments, while recognising the right for the 
parties to appraise and manage risk in accordance with the level 
of protection that each side deems appropriate … applied only to 
the extent necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health.48
Moreover, the EU has the intention of uniting with the USA in terms 
of becoming international standard setters on GMO regulation, and not 
lowering existing world standards that are currently applied.49
45 EU law allows GMOs, but only after strict safety assessment by the European Food 
Safety Authority, and not nearly as much as the USA does, and not to such an extent. Food 
legislation frameworks in the EU and US often differ considerably in terms of hygiene and 
control systems, labelling standards, and underlying cultural, ecological and ethical values. 
European consumers enjoy labelling of genetically modified foods and ingredients, but no 
similar labelling scheme exists in the US. The issues include the EU bans on genetically 
modified foods, EU raw milk cheese, hormone-treated beef, anti-microbial resistance, chlo-
rine-washed poultry and food products from cloned animals. The EU lifted the ban on lactic 
acid before the negotiations, and the USA followed by lifting the ban on EU beef in advance 
of the second round of trade talks. The first example shows how consumer standards are 
aggregated in TTIP; K Knoll, M Zinke and J Jaksche, ‘Safeguarding Consumer Rights and 
Protection in TTIP’ in Cardoso, Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 28-33. The 
EU has blocked imports of US genetically modified corn and soybeans, poultry treated with 
chlorine dioxide, beef treated with lactic acid to kill pathogens, and pork produced from 
hogs fed ractopamine, which promotes lean meat growth.
46 See: European Commission, ‘GMO Evaluation’ <http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/bio-
technology/evaluation/index_en.htm> accessed 7 March 2014.
47 European Commission (n 26).
48 European Commission (n 26).
49 See: Economist, ‘A Historic Trade Pact between America and Europe Needs Saving’ (2013) 
<http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21576704-historic-trade-pact-between-
america-and-europe-needs-saving-transatlantic> accessed 7 March 2013.
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The Americans are aware that this is going to be one of the most 
contentious topics that they need to negotiate.50 Although the USA could 
benefit from having a provision that allows for the free circulation of GM 
food, it is still uncertain how they will respond to the EU’s defensive 
stance when it comes to this topic.
The difference in regulatory approaches between the negotiating 
parties can be seen in the processes which food and other consumer 
products must undergo in order to enter the market. In the EU, the pre-
cautionary principle51 is applied, which means that ‘producers have to 
demonstrate the safety of GM crops and food products before they can be 
approved for sale’.52 Here, in the precautionary principle, an example of 
the EU’s ‘better safe than sorry’ approach can be seen,53 as EU regulation 
will not allow for any food or other consumables to circulate in its market 
unless it has been proven that they are absolutely healthy. There is not 
even a little space for taking risks.54 In contrast to the EU approach, in 
the USA ‘regulators generally see GM foods as substantially equivalent 
to unmodified products, and give them no additional oversight in the 
absence of scientific proof that any harm is caused by their sale and 
consumption’.55
If negotiators decide to achieve regulatory compatibility, there are 
two ways in which they could do so in terms of GMOs as part of the SPS 
50 This can be seen in the following: ‘“Food safety as exemplified by GMOs (genetically-
modified organisms) has been probably one of the most problematic, controversial areas of 
the EU-US economic relationship” said Peter Chase, a vice president at the USA Chamber of 
Commerce’, D Palmer and R Emmott, ‘USA Trade Deal Could be a Lot for Europe to Swallow’ 
Reuters (Washington 11 December 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/11/
us-usa-eu-trade-idUSBRE8BA05Y20121211?irpc=932> accessed 7 March 2014.
51 The precautionary principle applies when in a policy or action there is a suspected risk 
to consumers, animals, or the environment that lacks sufficient scientific evidence to prove 
its harm. Until scientific proof of the absence of the product having hazards has been pro-
vided, the precautionary principle justifies the decision to stop distribution or withdraw 
from the market certain products. This principle has been ratified by the WTO and has 
been applied by the EU in the hormone-meat dispute; M vom Endt, ‘Is TTIP a Race to the 
Bottom in Regulatory Standards? The Case of Hormone-treated Beef’ in Cardoso, Mthembu, 
Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 99-102.
52 S Lester, ‘Tackling Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership’ in Cardoso, Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 84-88.
53 The precautionary principle is seen as ‘an antidote to industrialization, globalization and 
Americanization’, vom Endt (n 51).
54 In the US, for instance, genetically modified foodstuffs can be sold, which is something 
that European consumers have a rather sceptical view of: ‘The majority of European con-
sumers regard gene technology with scepticism’, Knoll, Zinke and Jaksche (n 45) 28-33.
55 Lester (n 52) 84, 86.
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measures. One is harmonisation,56 and the other is mutual recognition.57 
Harmonisation would require a more in-sync mindset and similar mental-
ity between regulation makers and their protection policies, which is not 
likely to happen in the near future when it comes to the EU and USA. 
On the other hand, mutual recognition allows each party to have its own 
system of regulation but at the same time to recognise and approve the 
regulatory system of the other party, and thus accept products that come 
from it.
Harmonisation could move in three general directions. One is to 
adopt regulations similar to those currently in force in the EU. Another 
direction would be closer to the US approach to GMO legislation, while 
the third option is to create a sui generis legal framework that would com-
prise elements of both US and EU GMO legislation. It is very unlikely that 
the USA would ever agree to regulatory harmonisation which would lead 
to increased standards and stricter regulation when it comes to GMOs. 
The second variant, the mutual recognition system, is more likely to hap-
pen. Under this system, the consumer would be warned which regulatory 
system the product had undergone, and so could decide for themselves 
what suits them most. It would not be a surprise if EU food producers 
got a better deal if mutual recognition were applied. In such a case, it 
would come down to the responsible and informed consumer to decide 
on this important issue.58 One could argue that this would not be so 
bad after all, since an informed consumer should know what is best for 
them. If they do not care that much, then how can they at the same time 
demand to be protected? However, a study has found that over one half 
of consumers never, rarely or only sometimes read food labels, although 
the proportion of consumers who always consult food labels has risen to 
25% from 8%.59 Such results should put the responsibility on the state 
56 Harmonisation implies the alignment of regulations into a single best practice. This 
could be based on international standards from a standard-setting body, or simply in-
volve co-ordination among nations. Countries would basically agree to converge on a single 
standard or regulation. This is usually the most difficult way to achieve regulatory co-
operation. See Lester (n 52) 84-88.
57 Lester (n 52) 88: ‘Mutual Recognition can be achieved through mutual recognition agree-
ments or the acknowledgement of regulatory equivalence. Mutual recognition agreements 
approve testing and certification processes of other countries as acceptable for allowing sale 
in the importing country. This method is especially useful in eliminating duplicative testing 
and certification processes. Equivalence simply acknowledges that different technical regu-
lations can still achieve the same objectives or outcomes; sometimes there are just different 
methods of doing the same thing, and they should be treated as equivalent’.
58 Viviane Reding, European Commission Vice-President and the EU’s Justice Commis-
sioner stated: ‘Consumers, therefore, must be as much centre stage of EU policies as busi-
nesses. We need confident consumers to drive forward the European economy.’ Knoll, Zinke 
and Jaksche (n 45). 2.
59 Food Safety Authority of Ireland, ‘A Research Study into Consumers’ Attitudes to Food 
Labeling’ (2009) 23 <www.fsai.ie/workarea/downloadasset.aspx?id=8900> accessed 28 
June 2014.
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to lower the amount of risk for consumers and to apply stricter health 
standards (regarding food products in general and GMOs in particular) in 
order to protect the consumer instead of relying on the artificial concept 
of a responsible and informed consumer.
There are different regulatory problems for GM foods and for GM 
crops. For the former, as mentioned above, opponents point out the 
problem of information asymmetry between the consumer and producer, 
while for the latter there is the problem of externalities. The two biggest 
externalities are the potential costs for the health care system and for 
the ecosystem. These present additional arguments against GMOs. For 
example, a study was recently released by the Institute for Responsible 
Technology which uses data from the US Department of Agriculture, the 
US Environmental Protection Agency, medical journal reviews, and other 
independent research.60 A group of scientists put together a comprehen-
sive review of existing data that shows how European regulators have 
known that Monsanto’s glyphosate causes a number of birth malforma-
tions since at least the year 2002.61 Regulators misled the public about 
glyphosate’s safety, and in Germany the Federal Office for Consumer Pro-
tection and Food Safety told the European Commission that there was no 
evidence to suggest that glyphosate causes birth defects.62
GM foods also present a danger to the environment. The use of GM 
crops is causing fewer strains to be planted. In a traditional ecosystem 
based on 100 varieties of rice, a disease wiping out one strain is not too 
much of a problem.63 However, if just two strains are planted (as now 
occurs) and one is wiped out, the result is catastrophic.64 In addition, 
the removing of certain varieties of crops causes organisms which feed 
on these crops to be wiped out as well, such as the butterfly population 
decimated by a recent Monsanto field trial.65 This supports concerns that 
GM plants or transgenes can escape into the environment, and that there 
is an impact on rural ecosystems from broad-spectrum herbicides used 
on herbicide-tolerant GM crops.66 There are a lot of similar and different 
60 ‘GMOs Linked to Gluten Disorders Plaguing 18 million Americans’ Russia Today (Wash-
ington 26 November 2013) <http://rt.com/usa/gmo-gluten-sensitivity-trigger-343/> ac-
cessed 3 July 2014.
61 M Antoniou, ‘Roundup and Birth Defects: Is the Public Being Kept in the Dark?’ June 
2011 <http://earthopensource.org/files/pdfs/Roundup-and-birth-defects/Roundupand-
BirthDefectsv5.pdf> accessed 2 June 2014.
62 Antoniou (n 61).
63 D Whitman, ‘Genetically Modified Foods: Harmful or Helpful’, April 2000 <http://www.
csa.com/discoveryguides/gmfood/overview.php> accessed 30 June 2014.
64 Whitman (n 63).
65 Whitman (n 63).
66 WWF Switzerland, ‘Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs): A Danger to Sustainable 
Development of Agriculture’, May 2005, 4 <www.panda.org/downloads/trash/gmosadan-
gertosustainableagriculture.pdf> accessed 30 June 2014.
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scientific examples of GMOs’ negative effects on the ecosystem, but their 
full enumeration is not the purpose of this paper. 
However, when putting an American hat on, we can point to studies 
that have shown genetically modified crops as having a net environmen-
tal benefit, like a new one demonstrating the success of biotech’s ban-
ner crop, Bt corn, in reducing the use of pesticides. A new study, out in 
the Journal of Economic Entomology, looks specifically at the greenness 
of Bt sweetcorn.67 The findings here are that crops that produce their own 
pesticide need less pesticide applied.68
The proponents of GMOs argue that if GM products are given broad-
er access to the EU market, the prices of food would generally go down, 
since GM products can be produced at a lot more cheaply.69 Thus, not 
only would cheaper products arrive on the EU market, but existing, regu-
lar products would also have to go down in price in order to compete 
with cheaper GM food from the USA.70 Secondly, GM food is known to be 
better looking, and can be tastier if modified to be so, and certain min-
erals and vitamins from the food can be boosted with the use of genetic 
modification,71 making the overall quality of the food higher. This is, of 
course, if we do not take into account the possible threats from consum-
ing GM products which have not occurred yet in a form that would re-
quire their withdrawal from the US market.
On the other hand, opponents use the same argument but turn it 
the other way round: they think that because GM food has not been prov-
en to be without any serious dangers,72 there is a still a slight chance that 
side effects may occur later down the line of product consumption in the 
decades to come.73 To prove the point, the argument is invoked that there 
67 AM Shelton, DL Olmstead, EC Burkness, WD Hutchison, G Dively, C Welty and 
AN Sparks, ‘Multi-State Trials of Bt Sweet Corn Varieties for Control of the Corn Earworm 
(Lepidoptera: noctuidae)’ (2014) JEE 2151-2154.
68 Shelton et al (n 67).
69 See Brown University, ‘Foods from Genetically Modified Crops’ <http://brown.edu/ce/
adult/arise/resources/docs/GMFoodsBrochure.pdf> accessed 7 March 2014.
70 Even Neven Mimica, Commissioner for Consumer Protection, thinks that ‘consumers 
would benefit from more product diversity and lower prices due to increased competition in 
the market’, Knoll, Zinke and Jaksche (n 45) 3.
71 A Norton, ‘Genetically Modified Rice a Good Vitamin A Source’ Reuters (New York 15 
August 2012) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/15/us-genetically-modified-
rice-idUSBRE87E0RO20120815> accessed 8 March 2014; C Sarich, ‘3 GMO Foods Likely 
in Your Multi-Vitamins’ <http://naturalsociety.com/3-gmo-foods-likely-in-your-multi-vita-
mins/> accessed 8 March 2014.
72 Minor threats to human health can already be seen: R Mather, ‘The Threats from Geneti-
cally Modified Foods’ <http://www.motherearthnews.com/homesteading-and-livestock/
genetically-modified-foods-zm0z12amzmat.aspx> accessed 7 March 2014.
73 See: D Oakenfull, ‘Genetically Modified Food Risks’ <http://www.choice.com.au/re-
views-and-tests/food-and-health/food-and-drink/safety/gm-food.aspx> accessed 7 March 
2014.
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is currently no scientific consensus on GMO safety.74 Here, the EU ap-
plies its strict precautionary principle, as explained before, which would 
have to change, since there is no way of proving that GM products do not 
alter the human body over a longer period of consumption.75 In addition, 
the aforementioned cheapness of GMOs may ruin European agriculture 
by lowering food prices and forcing the EU to adopt similar GMO regula-
tions as those in the USA. At the same time, EU food producers may be 
pressurised into producing GM food or having to drop out of the game. 
Thus, the whole process could be reduced to a regulatory ‘race to the 
bottom’,76 in which each side reduces as many precautionary measures 
as it possibly can in order to maintain a stable agricultural sector.
Finally, after reviewing all the benefits and downsides, opponents 
are still not convinced that taking either the harmonisation or the mutual 
recognition path of regulatory synchronisation can be beneficial for the 
EU without there being too much risk, and so would rather not introduce 
GMOs onto the EU market through TTIP. Bearing in mind all the argu-
ments, it would seem wiser to put a provision in the TTIP chapter on SPS 
measures with an explicit exception for GMOs. Maybe the answer to this 
dilemma can be found in the status quo, letting time and science tell 
whether GMOs are safe to consume, which would satisfy the tough and 
careful EU legislators.
4. Investor state dispute settlement
Provisions on investor state dispute settlement (ISDS) are provisions 
in trade treaties and investment agreements that allow investors to bring 
proceedings against a foreign government that is a party to a treaty.77 
Such proceedings are brought under international law, and if the govern-
ment is found to be in breach of its treaty obligations, the harmed inves-
tor can receive monetary compensation or other forms of redress.78 ISDS 
is by far the most controversial part of TTIP negotiations on trade-related 
74 See: ENSSER, ‘Statement: No Scientific Consensus on GMO Safety’ <http://www.ens-
ser.org/increasing-public-information/no-scientific-consensus-on-gmo-safety/> accessed 
7 March 2014. Different opinions can be found: Occupy for Animals, ‘How GMO Foods Alter 
Organ Functions and Pose a Very Real Health Threat to Humans’ <http://www.occupyfor-
animals.org/how-gmo-foods-alter-organ-function-and-pose-a-very-real-health-threat-to-
humans.html> accessed 7 March 2014.
75 This is not provable in a satisfactory manner for the EU, because GMO products have 
existed only since the 1970s and there is still no notion about the effects they might have 
if consumed during an entire lifetime, since no one has consumed them from their birth to 
death across an average human life span.
76 See vom Endt (n 51) 99-102.
77 G Thompson, ‘The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)’ (House of 
Commons Library SN/EP/6688) [2014] 6.
78 Thompson (n 77).
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rules. Concerns have been raised among the general public that the ISDS 
provisions in TTIP will undermine the power of national governments to 
act in the interest of their citizens.79 For this controversial part of the TTIP 
proposal, there are arguments on both sides. Proponents argue that:
●  investment protection and ISDS attract foreign direct investment;
●  it increases the opportunity to convince other trading partners to 
have ISDS; 
●  it fosters certainty, predictability and impartiality.
Those in favour say that investment protection provisions, including 
ISDS, are important for investment flows. They say that investment leads 
to economic growth and more jobs.80 They believe that this is particularly 
the case in the EU, where the economy is very much based on being open 
to trade and investment.81 The belief is that investment is a key element 
in creating and maintaining businesses and jobs. Through investment, 
companies build the global value chains that play an increasing role in 
the modern international economy; they not only create new opportuni-
ties for trade but also value-added jobs and income.82
Another argument is that these provisions in TTIP will open the door 
to similar provisions in future FTAs concluded by the USA and EU. This 
goal could be achieved either via bilateral negotiations with third coun-
tries or by influencing the multilateral context, ie through the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law, where the EU has cre-
ated new rules on transparency that will apply beyond the EU’s own 
investment agreements.83 These provisions are especially important in 
79 G Monbiot, ‘This Transatlantic Trade Deal is a Full-frontal Assault on Democracy’, Guard-
ian (London 4 November 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/
nov/04/us-trade-deal-full-frontal-assault-on-democracy> accessed 18 January 2014; see 
also: Seattle to Brussels Network, ‘A Transatlantic Corporate Bill of Rights’, October 2013 
<http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/attachments/transatlantic-corporate-
bill-of-rights-oct13.pdf> accessed 18 January 2014; 175 NGOs have signed a letter to EU 
Commissioner for Trade Karel de Gucht and United States Trade Representative Michael 
Froman to express their opposition to the inclusion of ISDS in TTIP. 119 of those NGOs 
come from Europe. Two come from Slovenia and none from Croatia. See <http://www.
eeb.org/EEB/?LinkServID=A2B98635-5056-B741-B90148289C557DB&showMeta=0> ac-
cessed 7 July 2014.
80 A-HM. Bashi, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Some MENA Coun-
tries: Theory and Evidence’ (1999) TMENAE 5; See also: OS Oladipo and BI Vásquez Galán, 
‘The Controversy about Foreign Direct Investment as a Source of Growth for the Mexican 
Economy’ (2009) PDRLE 91-112; E Borensztein, J De Gregorio and J-W Lee, ‘How Does 
Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth’ (1995) NBER.
81 European Commission, ‘Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settle-
ment in EU Agreements’ (fact sheet, November 2013) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf> accessed 18 January 2014.
82 European Commission (n 81).
83 European Commission (n 81).
357CYELP 10 [2014] 341-370
developing and third world countries which have weaker property rights 
protection and less efficient domestic court systems.
According to the European Commission, the main reason for having 
an ISDS mechanism is that in many countries investment agreements 
are not directly enforceable in domestic courts.84 Therefore, an investor 
who finds themselves discriminated against or whose investment is ex-
propriated cannot invoke investment protection rules before the domestic 
courts to get redress, unless there is consent from the country to solve 
disputes with certain rules and at certain forums, for example at the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, which is often 
provided for by the state in the investment treaty itself.85 In international 
investment law,86 there are two types of procedure to enforce the right to 
protect investments. The first one is state-to-state arbitration. The inves-
tor needs to contact their state and convince it to commence arbitration 
proceedings against the state that received the investment on the basis 
of an infringement of rights guaranteed by the investment agreement.87 
The second possibility is that the investor files a protest against the state 
in which they have invested (investor-to-state arbitration).88 ISDS allows 
investors to rely directly on rules that were specifically designed to pro-
tect their investments. By creating legal certainty and predictability for 
companies, investment protection is also a tool for states around the 
world to attract and maintain foreign direct investment (FDI) to underpin 
their economy.89
An argument invoked by both sides is the neutrality and impartial-
ity of judges. Proponents of ISDS argue that the arbitrators are on av-
erage more neutral, independent and impartial than national judges in 
the domestic court system when there is a case of investment protection 
84 European Commission (n 81).
85 European Commission (n 81).
86 See also: K Sajko, ‘Arbitration Under Bilateral Treaties on Promotion and Protection of 
Investments Concluded Between Croatia and Other States’ (1998) (5) CAY, 123-138; K Sa-
jko, ‘Settlement of Disputes by Bilateral Investment Treaty: The Croatian Experience’ (1998) 
(2) ULR 657-669; K Sajko, ‘Washington Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States’ (1999) (6) CAY 129-140; K Sajko, ‘Napomene 
o arbitražnom rješavanju sporova na osnovi ugovora o poticanju i uzajamnoj zaštiti ula-
ganja između Hrvatske i Italije’ (2003) (2) PG 7-17; J Paulsson, ‘International Arbitration 
and the Generation of Legal Norms: Treaty Arbitration and International Law’ (2007) IC-
CACS 1, 13; JP Commission, ‘Precedent in Investment Arbitration: A Citation Analysis of a 
Developing Jurisprudence’ (2007) JIA; C McLachlan, L Shore and M Weiniger, International 
Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2007); S Vasciannie, 
‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’ 
(1999) BYIL 100-104.
87 See also: D Babić, ‘Pravičan i pošten tretman ulaganja u međunarodnom investicijskom 
pravu’ (2011) (1) ZPFZG 397, 400.
88 Babić (n 87).
89 European Commission (n 81).
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against the state that received the investment.90 Proponents of the ISDS 
question national judges’ neutrality and impartiality, because a domestic 
judge is a national of the state against which the complaint is filed, and 
a servant of the state who receives salaries and promotions from the do-
mestic court system, and is therefore more likely as a result of direct or 
indirect influences to vote in favour of that state.91
In contrast, opponents argue that even if a national judge is biased, 
it does not mean that he would automatically judge unreasonably against 
the investor, as the state also has an interest in attracting FDI and not 
acting in an unreasonable manner towards investors. In addition, op-
ponents also use the arguments of neutrality and impartiality against 
the arbitrators. ISDS has been accused of having an inherent bias to-
wards investors.92 Concerns about neutrality also arise from the arbitra-
tor’s ability to act as a judge in one case and an advocate in another.93 
Arbitrating panels are not necessarily drawn from a permanent roster of 
arbitrators, but are generally drawn from what might be called the inter-
national commercial arbitration bar.94 This is especially the case for the 
third arbitrator selected as president of the panel.95 As a result, arbitra-
tors can be deciding in one case, and arbitrating on behalf of clients in 
other cases with similar legal issues. The decisions they make as arbitra-
tors may have an impact on the positions of their own clients or of col-
leagues in their firms or on other contacts.96
The point here is not that the arbitrators lack personal integrity, but 
simply that the system for the selection of arbitrators permits individuals 
to argue for broad interpretations of treaty rights on behalf of clients at 
90 SR Bond, ‘Current Issues in International Commercial Arbitration: The International Ar-
bitrator: From the Perspective of the ICC International Court of Arbitration’ (1991) (1) NJILB 
1, 2.
91 See also B Manzanares Bastida, ‘The Independence and Impartiality of Arbitrators in 
International Commercial Arbitration’ (2007) (1) ME 1. 
92 C Cross, ‘The Treatment of Non-Investment Interests in Investor-State Disputes: Chal-
lenges for the TTIP Negotiations’ (2013) in Cardoso, Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido 
(eds) (n 4) 76, 77.
93 B Choudhury, ‘Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the 
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit?’ (2008) VJTL 775, 820.
94 A Cosbey and others, ‘Investment and Sustainable Development: A Guide to the Use and 
Potential of International Investment Agreements’ (2004) 6 IISD 1, 6.
95 Cosbey and others (n 94).
96 In a recent example of this dynamic, a former President of the International Court of Jus-
tice acted as counsel to a multinational water firm alleging violations of BIT provisions on 
expropriation, ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘protection and full security’ at the hands 
of the Argentine government. In another case, the same individual was given a direct hand, 
as a party-appointed arbitrator, in interpreting these same treaty commitments in a dispute 
involving the Czech Republic and a Dutch-registered broadcasting enterprise. In so doing, 
he enjoyed the opportunity to help influence the direction of substantive treaty interpreta-
tion in areas of interest to his clients, Cosbey and others (n 94).
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the same time as acting as arbitrators in other treaty claims.97 Although 
some authors believe that the most basic legal principle of any legal pro-
cess, that justice must be blind, is clearly not at play here,98 it could be 
said that there is a certain amount of bias, though not because arbitra-
tors want to benefit their clients. It is because they mostly come from the 
commercial arbitration system, ie they look at the relationship between 
the investor and the state as a purely commercial relationship. In other 
words, they primarily take into account the contractual terms between 
the state and the investor and whether the standard of fair and equitable 
treatment is respected, and sometimes do not consider the importance of 
certain state laws regarding the ecology, health, social policy, etc.
We can hardly blame them, because the investment treaties are 
based on the premise that the relationship between the investor and the 
state is a purely commercial one. Therefore, if arbitrators’ interpreta-
tions of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) benefit investors more, it is 
probably because they think with their commercial law hat on instead 
of thinking from the broader perspective of an international law lawyer. 
However, achieving the right balance between commercial law lawyers, 
international law lawyers and other lawyers is still a problem that needs 
to be solved within the system of investment arbitration, but is something 
that is outside the scope of this paper.
ISDS has also been accused of lacking core judicial safeguards of 
transparency and independence,99 and of investing immense power in a 
small core of professional arbitrators who dominate ISDS.100 One recent 
report labelled ISDS as the ‘world’s worst judicial system’.101 To conclude, 
neither side can claim the argument on neutrality and impartiality as a 
clear advantage.
The proponents of ISDS adhere to the logic that ‘the end justifies the 
means’.102 The goal is economic growth and the means is ISDS, which at-
tracts FDI. However, opponents103 could argue that:
97 Cosbey and others (n 94). 
98 Cosbey and others (n 94).
99 CN Brower, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy’, (2002) NLJ 1, 3.
100 P Eberhardt and C Olivet, ‘Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, Arbitrators and Fi-
nanciers are Fuelling an Investment Arbitration Boom’ (2012) CEO/TI 8.
101 M Khor, ‘The World’s Worst Judicial System?’ (2013) NLJ 1, 3.
102 N Machiavelli, The Prince (Bantam Dell, New York 1996) 122.
103 See also: N Bernasconi-Osterwalder and RT Hoffmann, ‘The German Nuclear Phase-out 
Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration? Background to the New Dispute 
Vattenfall v Germany (II)’ (2012) IISD; M Waibel, A Kaushal and others (eds), The Backlash 
Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality (Kluwer Law International, Amster-
dam 2010); J Brickhill and M Du Plessis, ‘Two’s Company, Three’s a Crowd: Public Interest 
Intervention in Investor-state Arbitration’ (Piero Foresti v South Africa) (2011) 1 SAJHR 
152-166; Choudhury (n 93) 775-832; C Cross and C Schliemann Radbruch, ‘When Invest-
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●  the goal will not be achieved to a satisfactory extent;
●  the means are not justified;
●  there is a better alternative.
Firstly, the argument that the European Commission uses is that:
companies investing abroad do encounter problems which - for 
a variety of reasons - cannot always be solved through the do-
mestic legal system. These problems range from the rare, but 
dramatic, occurrences of expropriations by the host country by 
force, discrimination, expropriation without proper compensa-
tion, revocation of business licences and abuses by the host 
state such as lack of due process to not being able to make inter-
national transfers of capital.104 
Of course, the described situations frequently happen in the world, 
but how many of them happen in the EU and USA? Is the domestic court 
system in these countries so unable and biased that it is holding back in-
vestors from investing in the EU or USA? The opponents of ISDS disagree 
with this notion, and think that the burden of proof is on the proponents 
to prove otherwise. These problems also happen in the EU and USA, but 
the system of law, investor rights, and the institutions in the EU and 
the USA are far superior to the majority of domestic legal systems in the 
world.
Secondly, opponents believe that the notion that bilateral investment 
treaties lead to more FDI is taken as an axiom by proponents. However, 
when you analyse twenty years of bilateral FDI flows from one county to 
another, you can find little strong evidence that BITs have stimulated 
additional investment.105 Recent studies by the World Bank and Yale Uni-
versity have found that BITs on their own do not attract investment.106 
Moreover, according to Jason W Yackee, ‘BITs are unlikely to be a signifi-
cant driver of foreign investment’.107 Another study concludes by saying 
ment Arbitration Curbs Domestic Regulatory Space: Consistent Solutions through Amicus 
Curiae Submissions by Regional Organisations’ (2013) LDR; L Johnson, ‘Case Note: How 
Chevron v Ecuador is Pushing the Boundaries of Arbitral Authority’ (2012) IISD; LE Pe-
terson, ‘Analysis: Tribunal’s Reading of Amicus Curiae Tests Could Make Life Difficult for 
Antagonistic Amici - and Those Seeking to Raise Novel Concerns such as Human Rights 
Law’ (2012) IAR; B Simma, ‘Foreign Investment Arbitration: A Place For Human Rights?’ 
(2011) ICLQ 573-596.
104 European Commission (n 81).
105 M Hallward-Driemeier, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI? Only a Bit … and 
they Could Bite’ (2003) World Bank DECRG 22.
106 KP Gallagher and MBL Birch, ‘Do Investment Agreements Attract Investment? Evidence 
from Latin America’ (2006) JWIT 14.
107 JW Yackee, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some 
Hints from Alternative Evidence’ (2010) No 1114 UWLGSRP 1.
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that ‘BITs impact on the flow of international investments essentially re-
mains unresolved’.108 The first question opponents could pose is: if BITs’ 
impact on FDI is in doubt, why should the EU sign this BIT? The second 
question is: if there is no grave breach of investor rights in the EU under 
the status quo, why would investment go up significantly after signing 
this BIT?
Thirdly, even if this BIT makes a difference and attracts investment, 
it is still not safe to say that there will be more economic growth. Although 
there is a widespread belief among policymakers that FDI generates posi-
tive productivity externalities for host countries, and although there are 
a lot of studies supporting this belief, certain authors claim the empirical 
evidence fails to confirm it.109 As one pair of authors put it, ‘Theory does 
point to reasons why external benefits (such as economic growth) might 
arise, but finding robust empirical evidence to support their existence 
is more difficult. In fact, supporting evidence is limited.’110 Other schol-
ars reach similar conclusions, such as ‘FDI does not exert any influence 
on growth’.111 Moreover, ‘an empirical analysis using cross-country data 
for the period 1981-1999 suggests that the total FDI exerts an ambigu-
ous effect on growth on developed countries’.112 Similarly to developed 
countries, ‘in the particular case of developing countries, both the micro 
and macro empirical literatures consistently find either no effect of FDI 
on the productivity of the host country firms and/or aggregate growth 
or negative effects’.113 One could say that the information on developing 
countries is not relevant, because there is no developing country in the 
EU, but that it is important to take a look at the positive effects of FDI on 
growth in general, or the lack of them.
 
108 KP Sauvant and LE Sachs. ‘The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows’ (2009) 3 EJIL 935, 
938.
109 L Alfaro and others, ‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote Growth? Exploring the 
Role of Financial Markets on Linkages’ (2009) JDE 27.
110 H Gorg and D Greenway, ‘Much Ado About Nothing? Do Domestic Firms Really Benefit 
From Foreign Direct Investment?’ (2003) 19 WBRO 189.
111 LK Papanastasiou and V Athanasios, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth 
in Transition Economies’ (2008) JDE 38.
112 L Alfaro, ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector Matter?’ (2003) JES 1; 
R Chandra and RJ Sandilands, ‘Does Investment Cause Growth? A Test of an Endogenous 
Demand-Driven Theory of Growth Applied to India 1950-96’ (2003) ONGT 244-265.
113 Papanastasiou and Athanasios (n 111); For similar conclusions, see: BJ Aitken and AE 
Harrison, ‘Do Domestic Firms Benefit from Direct Foreign Investment? Evidence from Ven-
ezuela’ (1999) 89 AER 605-618; J Haskel, S Pereira and M Slaughter, ‘Does Inward Foreign 
Direct Investment Boost the Productivity of Local Firms?’ (2001) 8433 NBER; BS Javorcik, 
‘Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic Firms? In Search of 
Spillovers Through Backward Linkages’ (2004) 94 AER 605-627.
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When discussing the impact of FDI on economic growth, we must 
bear in mind that there are several kinds of FDI: (1) natural-resource-
seeking investment; (2) market-seeking investment; (3) efficiency-seeking 
investment; (4) strategic-asset-seeking investment.114 Natural-resource-
seeking investment involves FDI in the extractive sector, market-seeking 
FDI is any type of investment that seeks to serve the host market, effi-
ciency-seeking FDI occurs when companies move some of their business 
to another country to keep costs down, and strategic-asset seeking FDI 
occurs when companies invest abroad to pick up new techniques and 
experience.115 The local impact is likely to be different for each kind. Mar-
ket-seeking FDI might lead to higher employment, but less trade,116 while 
efficiency-seeking FDI might lead to both more employment and more 
trade.117 In general, economists seem to agree that manufacturing indus-
tries are more wealth-creating than commodities or service industries.118 
Therefore, it is argued that FDI related to manufacturing will have a big-
ger impact on economic growth than extractive-sector FDI.119 Research 
done on economic growth in China seems to underscore this point.120 By 
the same token, Laura Alfaro has come to the conclusion that FDI in the 
primary sector tends to have a negative effect on growth but investment 
in manufacturing has a positive one, while evidence from the service sec-
tor is ambiguous.121
We can conclude that the evidence that FDI leads to economic 
growth is equivocal. Relatively recent research tends to point to evidence 
that spillover benefits exist but that the effects are not universal.122 One 
study concludes that the diverse results are due to differences in the host 
country: varying levels of indigenous human resources, private-sector 
sophistication, competition, and host-country policies toward trade and 
investment.123 Research has also produced mixed answers to the ques-
tion of whether FDI actually fosters economic growth in host countries, 
depending on which country is studied and which methodology is em-
114 JH Dunning, ‘The Eclectic Paradigm as an Envelope for Economic and Business Theo-
ries of MNE Activity’ 9 (2000) IBR 163.
115 UNCTD ‘Foreign Direct Investment and Development’ (1999) WIR 21.
116 J Sachs and A Warner, ‘Resource Abundance and Economic Growth’ 5(1995) NBR Work-
ing Paper No 5398 4.
117 Sachs and Warner (n 116).
118 Sachs and Warner (n 116).
119 Sachs and Warner (n 116).
120 See also: PJ Buckley and others, ‘FDI, Regional Differences and Economic Growth: Panel 
Data Evidence from China’ (2002) 11 TC 1-28.
121 Alfaro (n 112) 244.
122 TH Moran, EM Graham and M Blomström, Does Foreign Direct Investment Promote De-
velopment? (Institute for International Economics, Washington 2005) 24.
123 Moran, Graham and Blomström (n 122) 5.
363CYELP 10 [2014] 341-370
ployed.124 According to Theodore H Moran, FDI can have dramatically 
different impacts, both positive and negative.125 So far, all the empirical 
results reveal that there is no unified theoretical explanation for FDI ef-
fects, and it seems very unlikely at this point that such a unified theory 
will emerge.126
Taking into account the ambiguous evidence that FDI leads to eco-
nomic growth, opponents could argue that the means (ISDS) are not jus-
tified, because ISDS would constitute a new legal order which would limit 
the sovereignty of the state by undermining government policies enacted 
through democratic procedures, while in return there would be only the 
possibility of economic growth. If the EU or USA limit their sovereignty, 
they should definitely get something more significant in return than just 
the possibility of economic growth. Of course, it would be too high a bur-
den to demand a 100% guarantee that there will be economic growth, as 
most things in life can never be 100% guaranteed. However, there should 
be a fair balance between the abovementioned costs and the chance of 
positive returns.
The means are also not justified because ISDS puts an additional 
cost on the state and risks a ‘regulatory chill’. The number of ISDS claims 
is rising rapidly,127 and in most cases Member States would have to pay 
a substantial amount for each ISDS claim.128 Even when ISDS claims 
are unsuccessful, there is widespread concern that the enormous cost 
of defending them may deter states from pursuing future policy goals or 
taking regulatory measures that may have a potential impact on foreign 
investors, which is often described as ‘regulatory chill’.129 Investors have 
made claims of up to USD 114 billion, and 2012 saw the highest ever 
award for an ISDS claim of USD 1.77 billion.130
124 Moran, Graham and Blomström (n 122) 49.
125 Moran, Graham and Blomström (n 122) 375.
126 V Denisia, ‘Foreign Direct Investment Theories: An Overview of the Main FDI Theories’ 
(2010) EJIS 109.
127 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, there are over 
3,200 IIAs in existence; in 2012, a record 58 ISDS claims were filed and the total number 
of known treaty-based claims reached 514. This explosion of claims has been driven in part 
by the wide interpretations given to vague international investment agreement provisions. 
Investors are protected not just against direct expropriation of their investments by host 
states. Regulatory and policy measures taken by host states that interfere with or impact 
on foreign investments can amount to indirect expropriation or breach standards of fair and 
equitable treatment.
128 The tabs charged by elite law firms can be USD 1,000 per hour, per lawyer in investment 
treaty cases, with whole teams handling them. Arbitrators earn daily fees of USD 3,000 or 
more.
129 Cross (n 92).
130 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, ‘Research and Policy Analysis’ 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20
%28IIA%29/Research-and-Policy-Analysis.aspx> accessed 26 January 2014.
364 Stefan Martinić, Mihael Maljak: Certain Controversial Issues of EU-US Trade negotiations... 
In addition, the settlement of ISDS cases can have a negative impact 
on regulatory standards. Two ISDS case are a good example of this. The 
first one is Vattenfall I v Germany. In 2009, the Swedish energy com-
pany Vattenfall started an ISDS procedure against Germany. Vattenfall 
had engaged in the construction of a coal fired power plant in Hamburg-
Moorburg, located on the River Elbe.131 When Hamburg’s environmental 
authority imposed quality controls on the waste waters released into the 
river from the power plant, Vattenfall claimed that these standards made 
the investment project unviable. Using ISDS provisions, the company 
asked Germany for compensation totalling EUR 1.4 billion. The case was 
eventually settled when the City of Hamburg agreed to lower the environ-
mental requirements previously set.132 The second example is Ethyl vs 
Canada. The chemical manufacturer Ethyl sued Canada using ISDS over 
the introduction of a ban on the toxic chemical MMT. The settlement of 
the case saw Canada reverse the ban and agree on a USD 13 million pay-
ment. Incidentally, the same chemical was banned in the USA.133
All in all, opponents believe that ISDS should not be a part of TTIP 
because it is questionable if ISDS would achieve its goals of attracting 
FDI and leading to economic growth in a satisfactory manner. Further-
more, after analysing the arguments on both sides, it seems that there 
are more losses than gains from ISDS in the EU-USA trade deal, and that 
the means for achieving the goal are not justified. Since both the EU and 
USA have very strong domestic court systems and property rights pro-
tection, one can come to the conclusion that the status quo is a better 
alternative.
5. Intellectual property rights
Intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is no stranger to EU 
FTAs. Out of 31 EU FTAs that are currently in force, a big majority, more 
precisely 23, contain provisions about IP protection. However, the mere 
fact that the IPR is a usual suspect in FTA negotiations did not stop 
civil society from declaring it a controversial and a sensitive topic.134 The 
131 Friends of the Earth Europe, ‘What is the “investor-state dispute settlement”?’ <http://
www.foeeurope.org/isds/> accessed 23 July 2014.
132 Friends of the Earth Europe (n 131).
133 Friends of the Earth Europe (n 131).
134 Eg The Civil Society Declaration released by 47 European and international organisa-
tions to exclude from the upcoming Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (TTIP) any provi-
sions related to patents, copyright, trademarks, data protection, geographical indications, or 
other forms of so-called intellectual property, ‘IP out of TTIP’ 15 March 2013 <http://www.
laquadrature.net/en/no-copyright-in-eu-us-trade-agreement> accessed 18 February 2014; 
B Kilic, ‘First SOPA then ACTA, now TTIP: Here We Go Again’ 18 March 2013 <http://www.
citizenvox.org/2013/03/18/first-sopa-then-acta-now-TTIP-here-we-go-again/> accessed 18 
February 2014.
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debate concerns whether to include an IP chapter in TTIP or not. The 
proponents of the idea stress the positive aspects of IP rights. The pri-
mary, well-known function of an IP right is to give its holder a competi-
tive advantage in its commercial activities by preventing unauthorised 
exploitation by others.135 According to the EU Commission, this is espe-
cially important for small and medium-sized entrepreneurs (SMEs) for 
whom IP rights serve as powerful weapons to compete with much larger 
companies.136 There are plenty of benefits of IPR,137 but the big question 
is whether it should be included in TTIP.
Proponents offer two main arguments in favour of inclusion. The 
first one is to reinforce the notion that the chapter on IPR is an integral 
part of trade agreements. IPR protection in the EU and USA might be at 
a high level, but the goal is to engage other countries (such as China, 
India, Brazil or Thailand)138 to follow their lead and either ramp up the 
protection of IPR in their domestic systems or to include an IPR chapter 
in trade agreements.139 The second main argument is to make the EU and 
135 European Commission, ‘Intellectual Property: Positive Aspects of IP rights’ <http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/january/tradoc_142108.pdf> accessed 19 February 
2014.
136 European Commission (n 135).
137 Many counterfeit products place citizens’ safety or health at risk, for instance where 
vehicle spare parts or drugs are concerned. Enforcing IP rights in respect of such products 
guarantees at least that the products’ origin is known and that the products are genuine, 
whereas counterfeit products often do not comply with the applicable safety standards. This 
is especially true for trademarks, but patent licensing contracts, for instance, may also in-
clude quality insurance clauses. Moreover, where a company has protected its products (or 
processes, etc) with IP rights, it can derive revenues not only from their direct exploitation 
(by that company) but also from their indirect exploitation by third parties under licensing 
contracts. These additional indirect revenues sometimes exceed the profits resulting from 
direct exploitation, especially as they do not require additional internal manufacturing ca-
pacities. Such an approach may therefore be particularly relevant for SMEs. It is also im-
portant for universities and public research centres, which usually do not have any direct 
exploitation activities. In addition, while certain procedures required for the registration 
of IP rights are considered to be expensive, in particular by SMEs, it should be noted that 
certain IP rights can be enjoyed without any formal procedure and without paying any offi-
cial fees. This is particularly the case for copyright and unregistered designs. Furthermore, 
even where a company (or university, etc) does not intend to protect its own inventions, its 
staff (researchers, etc) can still make use of patent information. Patents are the most prolific 
and up-to-date source of technological information, and contain detailed technical informa-
tion which often cannot be found anywhere else. It is estimated that up to 80% of current 
technical knowledge can only be found in patent documents. Moreover, this information is 
rapidly available, as most patent applications are published 18 months after their first fil-
ing. See: European Commission (n 135).
138 See also: the International IP Index which ranks the countries on their IP environment, 
ie their protection of copyrights, patents, etc; USA Chambers of Commerce, ‘GIPC Inter-
national IP Index’ <http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/gipcindex/> accessed 20 February 
2014.
139 See also: T Kovziridze, ‘Differences in Regulatory Approach between the EU and the US: 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its Impact on Trade with Third 
Countries’ in Cardoso, Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 47-50; V Trigkas, 
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US IPR systems more compatible and harmonised, and decrease transac-
tion costs by removing non-tariff barriers. For example, in trademark law 
there are differences between systems. The USA follows the use-based 
system, whereas the EU has always based trademark protection on reg-
istration. If the systems were more compatible, there would be a decrease 
in transaction costs. Unfortunately, we cannot discuss in detail the pos-
sibility of a decrease in transaction costs, because there is still no con-
sensus on what exactly the IPR chapter would look like, and how exactly 
the IPR chapter would be different in comparison with other EU FTAs. 
At least, so far it has not been made public what exactly the IPR chapter 
would look like.
However, opponents might beg to differ on the point of a decrease 
in transaction costs. Although differences in the systems exist, they are 
marginal and the transaction costs are minimal.140 There might be a need 
to consult a lawyer for advice on the differences, but because of the fre-
quent trade between the EU and USA, they are well known so they do not 
present a meaningful impediment to trade. Thus, if the differences are 
small, the benefits will be too. Opponents do not believe that the differ-
ences are a strong argument for an IPR chapter in TTIP.
On the other hand, IP protection is already at a high level in both the 
‘The Strategic Implications of TTIP: “Will it Engage or Contain China?”’ in Cardoso, Mthem-
bu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 50-54; P Mthembu, ‘A Transatlantic Partnership 
with Ripples Across the Oceans: What Does Africa Stand to Gain or Lose?’ in Cardoso, 
Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 54-59; Venhaus (n 4) 59-63.
140 Examples of differences between the EU and US systems: ‘In the patent field, the differ-
ences used to be quite substantial. The US had this first-to-invent structure, whereas the 
EU and most of the rest of the world actually adopted the first-to-file system of patenting, 
but the US has recently converted to the majority opinion, so that’s hardly an argument. 
Another area of differences … perhaps is, to a degree, subject matter. The US has been 
very liberal in protecting subject matter of the more elusive kind, like business models 
and software, but if you look at recent US court cases, particularly the Bilski case, decided 
by the Supreme Court, the US now seems to be more in line, more restrictive, with Euro-
pean standards. If you look at Europe, Europe actually excludes computer programs per se 
from patentability but does allow and in practice generously allows hardware implemented 
software patenting’. Taken from: B Hugenholtz, ‘What Should be the Role for Intellectual 
Property Rights in the TTIP’, round table on the topic 21 May 2013 <http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=q9X_fN015yc&noredirect=1> accessed 20 February 2014. In the field of GIs, 
the most contentious area, ‘EU regulations protect geographical indications and product 
protection is tied to their geographical origin. The US approach is different and oriented 
towards the protection of trademark rather than geographical origin of the product. For ex-
ample, whereas the EU only acknowledges the champagne produced in the respective area 
of France called Champagne and prohibits sale of any products called champagne not pro-
duced in this region of France, it is perfectly fine in the US to produce and sell Californian 
or other sparkling wine called champagne. In this case, not geographical origin but trade-
mark is subject to protection under intellectual property rights regulations’, M Venhaus, 
‘Differences in Regulatory Approach Between the EU and the US: Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and its Impact on Trade with Third Countries’ in Cardoso, 
Mthembu, Venhaus and Verde Garrido (eds) (n 4) 47-49.
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EU and USA. Both parties exceed the TRIPS minimum and have a lot of 
TRIPS-Plus elements.141 Thus, the argument on strengthening IP protec-
tion is not a sound one.
Including IP standards in TTIP necessarily locks in these standards 
between the EU and USA. Even if these standards comply with what we 
are used to now, they will restrict us in the future if we want to reform,142 
and this is not a theoretical argument. Reform is very much in the air 
nowadays, both in the USA and EU, particularly in the field of copyright. 
There are discussions going on in the United States Congress,143 the Reg-
ister of Copyrights of the United States has urged Congress to reform,144 
and there are discussions in the European Parliament about the scope 
and extent of copyright protection.145 The same winds of change are blow-
ing across the fields of patents, trademarks, etc. For instance, at the mo-
ment, Member States are proceeding with the signing and ratification of 
the Agreement on a Unified EU Patent Court.146 If we lock in now, we will 
regret it because we cannot roll it back easily if in the meantime higher 
standards are reached. Opponents believe that this is the killer argument 
141 In recent years, many developing countries have been coming under pressure to enact 
or implement even tougher or more restrictive conditions in their patent laws than are 
required by the TRIPS Agreement. These are known as ‘TRIPS plus’ provisions. Countries 
are not obliged by international law to do this, but many, such as Brazil, China or Central 
American states adopt these as part of trade agreements with the United States or the 
European Union. Common examples of TRIPS plus provisions include extending the term 
of a patent longer than the twenty-year minimum, or introducing provisions that limit the 
use of compulsory licences or that restrict generic competition. One of these provisions is 
known as data exclusivity. This refers to exclusive rights granted over the pharmaceutical 
test data submitted by companies to drug regulatory authorities to obtain market authori-
sation. It means that information concerning a drug’s safety and efficacy is kept confidential 
for a period of five or ten years. If a generic manufacturer wants to register a drug in that 
country, it is not allowed simply to show that their product is therapeutically equivalent 
to the originator product. Instead, it must either sit out the exclusivity period, or take the 
route of repeating lengthy clinical trials to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of the drug: 
trials that have already been undertaken; See: M El-Said, ‘The European Union Free Trade 
Agreements and TRIPS-Plus Challenges and Opportunities for the Ukraine’ <http://www.
undp.org.ua/images/stories/IPRandAEM_Kyiv/EU TRIPS-Plus Rules Ukraine_ENG.doc> 
accessed 7 July 2014; F Rossi, ‘Free Trade Agreements and TRIPS-plus Measures’ (2006) 
IPM 150-172; M El-Said, ‘The Road from TRIPS-Minus, to TRIPS, to TRIPS PLUS’ (2005) 
JWIP 53-65.
142 Hugenholtz (n 140).
143 A Robertson, ‘Free Speech Doesn’t Mean Free Stuff’: Congress Begins Copyright Reform 
with a Plea for Civility’ <http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/17/4341038/congress-starts-
copyright-hearings-with-a-plea-for-civility> accessed 20 February 2014.
144 MA Pallante, ‘The Next Great Copyright Act’ (2013) CJLA 315-344.
145 Eg Parliament Report (EP) 2012/0180 on the proposal for a directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and 
multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market 
[2012].
146 European Commission, Patents, 26 May 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
indprop/patent/index_en.htm> accessed 25 July 2014.
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against an IPR chapter. However, why would opponents want reform that 
would actually lower the level of copyright protection? They believe that 
the purpose of copyright is to benefit the public, and thus the lower the 
level of protection, the more the public can freely enjoy content that is 
copyrighted.147 Secondly, they believe that copyright as it is violates the 
tenets of free market capitalism. According to them, under the current 
system of copyright, producers of content are entitled to a guaranteed, 
government instituted, government subsidised content monopoly.148 
Thirdly, they argue that the current copyright regime does not lead to 
the greatest level of innovation and productivity. It is a system that picks 
winners and losers, and the losers are new industries that could generate 
new wealth and added value. They are of the opinion that we frankly may 
have no idea how it actually hurts innovation, because we do not know 
what cannot be produced as a result of our current system.149
The next argument comes from the perspective of pragmatism. No 
matter how many times negotiators have made it clear and stressed that 
TTIP is different from the highly controversial ACTA,150 (for example, the 
ACTA provisions on IPR enforcement in the digital environment in ACTA 
articles 27(2) to 27(4) will not be part of the TTIP negotiations, and nei-
ther will ACTA provisions on criminal sanctions),151 and no matter how 
different it really will be, the public still equates the two.152 If the negotia-
tors wish to minimise the risk of TTIP being rejected as ACTA was, then 
they should leave the IPR out of TTIP negotiations, just as they did with 
data protection.153
Moreover, as the European Generic Medicines Association points 
out, ‘any attempt to make IPRs stronger would have a negative impact 
147 M Masnick, ‘House Republicans: Copyright Law Destroys Markets; It’s Time for Real Re-
form’, 16 November 2012 <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121116/16481921080/
house-republicans-copyright-law-destroys-markets-its-time-real-reform.shtml> accessed 3 
July 2014.
148 Masnick (n 147).
149 Masnick (n 147).
150 The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) was a multinational treaty for the pur-
pose of establishing international standards for intellectual property rights enforcement. 
The agreement aimed to establish an international legal framework for targeting counter-
feit goods, generic medicines and copyright infringement on the internet, and would have 
created a new governing body outside existing forums, such as the World Trade Organiza-
tion, the World Intellectual Property Organization, or the United Nations. It was rejected by 
the European Parliament.
151 European Commission ‘How Much Does the TTIP Have in Common with ACTA?’ [2013] 1.
152  Civil Society Declaration (n 134).
153 See: V Reding, ‘Towards a More Dynamic Transatlantic Area of Growth and Investment’ 
(Speech during a conference organised by the Peterson Institute, SAIS and the EU Del-
egation in Washington, DC, SPEECH/13/867) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
SPEECH-13-867_en.htm> accessed 20 February 2014.
369CYELP 10 [2014] 341-370
on the penetration of generic medicines in the markets’,154 as it would re-
duce competition for cheaper and more effective drugs, and consequently 
have an impact on patients’ access to affordable medicines.155
On the other hand, it is maybe for the better, because cheaper ge-
neric drugs are less expensive but are rarely better quality or a safer 
solution. The problem with generic drugs is that they do not have to go 
through clinical efficacy trials and are not kept at the same standards 
as brand name drugs.156 There have been a lot of examples of negative 
health consequences from generic drugs; one of them is the more sei-
zures resulting from switching from the brand name drug Dilantin to 
generic drugs.157 The proponents for the inclusion of the IPR chapter in 
TTIP can argue that generic drugs are maybe cheaper than brand name 
drugs but the potential health consequences could be very expensive.
6. Conclusion
If it is to be judged on the basis of the EU negotiation mandate and 
the current state of negotiations, TTIP will be one of the most compre-
hensive FTAs ever concluded by the EU, and as a result the next step in 
the evolution of the EU’s foreign trade policy. However, TTIP is not just 
another FTA. Unlike all the other EU FTAs, this agreement is negotiated 
with a partner of similar political and economic strength, which makes 
the negotiations even more challenging and enhances the possibility of 
an increase in the comprehensiveness and far-reaching impact of the EU-
USA trade deal.
It is precisely because of this that there should be a broad debate on 
its justifiability. TTIP brings a lot of new things to the discussion table, 
such as liberalisation of the audiovisual sector, inclusion of ISDS and 
greater access of GMOs to the EU market. No other EU FTA has aroused 
so much interest and scrutiny from civil society, various NGOs and aca-
demics. The majority of them have taken a cautious stance towards the 
most controversial issues and advised against allowing GMOs greater 
154 A ‘generic medicine’ is a medicine that is developed to be the same as a medicine that 
has already been authorised. Generic medicines are widely used in the EU in cost-effective 
treatment programmes and are prescribed as effective alternatives to more expensive phar-
maceuticals.
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access to the EU market, and also against including ISDS and the chap-
ter on protection of intellectual property rights, but proposed allowing 
l’exception culturelle.
Although the authors understand that it is much easier to cherry-
pick in a theoretical discussion than in the real world politics of negotiat-
ing the biggest bilateral trade deal in history, they believe that the general 
public should be informed in greater detail of the pros and cons. It is 
unquestionable that there will be economic benefits from TTIP, but the 
question is what will we sacrifice for them and is it worth it? The answer 
to the last question, the authors will leave to the reader.
